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RESUMEN: El artículo examina el nacimiento del concepto de mythos/mito en el contexto de la 
historiografía y la mitografía de la Grecia arcaica. La posibilidad de oponerse a relatos tradicionales es un 
factor crítico en este proceso y se relaciona estrechamente con los esfuerzos de los autores por fijar su 
autoridad. Se compara la práctica de Heródoto con la de los primeros mitógrafos y, aunque hay amplias 
similitudes, hay diferencias cruciales en el tratamiento de los asuntos religiosos. Los escrúpulos 
personales de Heródoto responden en parte a su bien conocida reserva en lo referente a los dioses, pero es 
también relevante su actitud acerca de la tarea del historiador y su  noción de cómo los dioses intervienen 
en la historia. Mientras que los mitógrafos tratan de historicizar la mitología, Heródoto trata de modo 
notable de desmitologizar la historia, separando ambas, pero al mismo tiempo definiendo con más 
profundidad que nunca sus auténticas interconexiones. Esta situación sugiere algunas consideraciones 
generales acerca de la relación entre mito y ritual en Grecia. 
 
ABSTRACT: The article examines the emerging concept of mythos/myth in the context of early Greek 
historiography and mythography. The possibility of contesting traditional stories is a critical factor in this 
process, and is closely related to the efforts of writers to establish their authority. Herodotos’ practice is 
compared with that of the early mythographers, and though there are some broad similarities, there are 
crucial differences in their approach to religious matters. Herodotos’ personal scruples account for some 
of his well-known reticence about the gods, but also relevant is his attitude to the historian’s task, and his 
notion of how gods act in history. If mythographers attempt to historicise mythology, he quite 
remarkably attempts to demythologise history, separating the two but at the same time defining more 
profoundly than ever their true interconnections. This situation prompts some general thoughts on the 
relationship between Greek myth and ritual.  
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The relationship between ‘myth’ and ‘religion’ is an old and much-discussed 
topic. Though a general consensus about the pragmatic meaning of ‘myth’ as 
‘traditional tale’ seems to have emerged, less agreement exists around ‘religion’, and 
even less around the phenomenology of either term, or their functional relation to 
each other. The purpose of this essay is not to offer, at least directly, general thoughts 
on these two concepts, but to explore their interaction in a particular context, that of 
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Greece of the fifth century BC, and more particularly in the context of its 
mythography and historiography. For myth I refer to the definition of Bruce Louden, 
itself an expansion of Walter Burkert’s: ‘a sacred, traditional narrative, which depicts 
the interrelations of mortals and gods, is especially concerned with defining what is 
moral behavior for a given culture, and passes on key information about that 
culture’s institutions’1. For ‘religion’, I wish to adopt a somewhat restricted meaning, 
to refer primarily to actions that people either individually or in groups perform 
because of their belief in divinity. This might seem to be a definition of ‘ritual’ rather 
than ‘religion’. But I am interested in the social nexus and meaning of ritual actions, 
which may be called the social face of religion, and so wish to consider not only the 
actions but their context and understanding. This is at least part of what is meant by 
‘religion’, but admittedly it is a much broader term, encompassing not only ritual but 
myth, belief, values, individual and group psychology and sociology. For a brief 
discussion some narrowing of scope is required.  
The distinction of what people say and what people do about the gods is 
traditional and works well enough as a starting point for a functional analysis. But it 
does not take long before one encounters difficulties. With respect to Greek society, 
for instance, the question arises as to whether one should include stories about heroes 
in the category of myth. Heroes are humans, but have close relations with gods, 
normally being descended from them. Louden of course wants and needs to include 
the heroes of the Iliad in his definition, extending myth as ‘stories about gods’ to 
encompass ‘stories about people closely related to gods’. Most people would accept 
that extension, and of course the gods are closely involved in the action of the Iliad. 
But the author’s focus is on the human world, and if the real power of myth comes 
from its dealings with the supernatural, this is to deal with the supernatural at one 
remove. Most Greeks regarded the heroes of the Trojan War as historical humans. 
The more one considers stories about them to be history, the less room there would 
seem to be to consider them as myth, if these are ‘sacred’ tales. At the same time, 
many of these heroes received cult honours, in ways often indistinguishable from 
divine worship. We shall see that the ambivalent status of the heroes takes us directly 
to the heart of some interesting questions about Greek myth and Greek religion.  
Another point of contention in speaking of Greek myth and religion is that 
these are not native Greek categories, raising difficult issues for those who would 
wish to discuss them. With respect to religion, I agree that it is not a Greek category, 
but do not think it matters; they had no categories ‘economy’2, ‘society’, or 
 
1 B. Louden, The Iliad: Structure, Myth, and Meaning (Baltimore 2006) 9. 
2 That is, in the modern sense of course, not oikonomia. 
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‘psychology’ either, but we can study them nonetheless. Realising that some of the 
assumptions we bring about these terms to their analysis in an ancient context can 
get in the way of understanding does not negate the existence of the object of study, 
or prove that it is fantasy. Religion is an anthropological constant and the problem 
posed here is the same for anyone who would study a foreign religion. No matter 
how different Greek religion is, if it were totally different it would not be possible to 
speak about it at all (translation would simply not work): the fact that people do 
continue to speak of it implicitly indicates that they believe translation is possible.  
With respect to myth, the issue is subtler. Obviously it is a Greek category in 
one sense; mythos is a Greek word, and by the time one reaches the Hellenistic and 
early Roman periods, it is used very commonly-there are hundreds of examples-to 
denote old tales about gods and heroes that contain a pronounced element of 
imagination3. They are contrasted with rational logos. There is significant overlap 
here between the modern and ancient use of the word. There is danger, however, in 
carelessly thinking that they are identical. The mythos/logos contrast, as it has been 
theorised since the Enlightenment, transfers the qualities of particular tales to the 
minds and societies of those who tell them: thus we have mythical mentalities and 
mythical ages, which are supposedly superseded by rational ones. As an historical 
analysis, this is clearly an untenable construct4. But it is equally problematic to 
dispense with the terms altogether on account of this situation. A straightforward 
distinction between imagination and reason with respect to accounts about the past 
or about the gods existed already before the Hellenistic period. It is undeniable in 
Plato, and I would argue that the complexity of the doctrine in Plato, whereby 
mythos and logos in the sublunar world are thoroughly entangled with one another, 
suggests that the distinction is not original with him; rather he was refining a pre-
existing, much simpler dichotomy which others had applied in ways that were to him 
 
3 In what follows on mythos and logos I summarise what will be supported at greater length in a 
forthcoming article. 
4 Extended critique in R. Buxton (ed.), From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek 
Thought (Oxford 1999); see also F. Graf, ‘Myth’, in S. Iles Johnston (ed.), Religions of the Ancient World 
(Cambridge, MA and London 2004) 45-58 for an overview. One end of the spectrum in this debate is 
staked out by C. Calame, who would deny the use of ‘myth’ in a Greek context altogether; see his 
contribution to the Buxton volume, ‘The Rhetoric of muthos and logos: Forms of Figurative Discourse’, 
119-43, and ‘Greek Myth and Greek Religion’, in R. D. Woodard (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Greek Mythology (Cambridge 2007) 259-85. From the vast literature on myth, religion, and ritual I 
mention B. Kowalzig. Singing for the Gods. Performance of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical 
Greece (Oxford 2007) 13-55; J. Bremmer, ‘Ritual’, in Johnston, op. cit. 32-44, and ‘Walter Burkert on 
Ancient Myth and Ritual’, forthcoming in A. Bierl & W. Braungart, edd., Gewalt und Opfer. Im Dialog 
mit Walter Burkert (Berlin 2010) 1-16, each with further references. 
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problematic, but which nevertheless pointed the way to a true solution, linked to both 
epistemology and metaphysics. Plato’s doctrine may be sophisticated, challenging, 
and at times very confusing, but starts from the simple contrast of reason vs. 
imagination, as many passages show5. For Plato, this contrast was a strongly 
philosophical and ideological construct. Choosing not to use the terms ‘mythos’ and 
‘logos’ at best requires inconvenient and unnecessary periphrasis for concepts with 
which we are already comfortably familiar; at worst it could misrepresent an 
important chapter in intellectual history, in which the historians played their part.  
A priori one would guess that the people against whom Plato was reacting 
were the Sophists; and since in the Protagoras, the arch-Sophist himself introduces 
the distinction with a flourish (320c), we should not doubt that it stems from his own 
work (for which there is some independent evidence anyway)6 . Protagoras’ mythos 
is about Prometheus, and satisfies Louden’s definition on all counts. The Sophists 
would have introduced the distinction as part of their study of rhetoric: imaginative 
stories with morals or allegorical meaning can be very effective devices of 
persuasion, as much as (or even more than) dry logic. In itself this distinction does 
not require that the mythoi would be ‘myths’ in the sense of ‘sacred tales’, but this is 
what it came to in practice, for contingent cultural reasons: the great body of Greek 
tales propagated by poets, with whom the Sophists placed themselves in conscious 
rivalry, were the obvious body of material on which to draw; tradition further 
sanctioned individual interpretations and re-writings of these stories, according to the 
purpose to which they were put. So there was ample scope for the imagination here, 
without recourse to fiction such as that of the later Greek novels: these would not 
have the authority of tradition to enhance their persuasive power.  
‘Authority’ is an important concept here, and provides a link to the historians. 
The history of the Greek word mythos has been carefully studied by various scholars. 
In Homer it is often associated with an authoritative speech-act7. The process by 
which its meaning changes from ‘speech which commands obedience and respect’ 
to ‘imaginative tales’ is not at first sight a straightforward one. I would argue that the 
key lies in the contestation of authority that characterised Greek public and 
 
5 For discussions see the essays of P. Murray, C. J. Rowe, and T.K. Johansen in Buxton From Myth to 
Reason? (last note); K. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato (Cambridge 2000); 
C.J. Rowe, ‘The Status of the “Myth” in Plato’s Timaeus,’ in Plato Physicus. Cosmologia e antropologia 
nel Timeo, edd. C. Natali, S. Maso (Amsterdam 2003) 21-31. 
6 See R. Fowler, ‘Herodotos and his Contemporaries’, JHS 116 (1996) 62-87 at 86.    
7 Richard P. Martin, The Language of Heroes Speech and Performance in the Iliad (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca NY 1989). I.J.F. de Jong in her review, Mnem. 4.45 (1992) 392-7, offers some important 
qualifications of Martin’s arguments, but the tendency with respect to mythos remains clear. 
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intellectual life. The proem to Hekataios’ Genealogies8 illustrates the issue. ‘Thus 
speaks (mytheitai) Hekataios of Miletus: I write what I think to be true, since the 
tales (logoi) of the Greeks are many and ridiculous, as it seems to me.’ Here, 
logoi-those of the Greeks-are ridiculous and incredible, whereas the mythos of 
Hekataios will be true: exactly the opposite of the later meaning of logos and mythos. 
In this proem, Hekataios is appropriating to himself the traditional role of the Muses; 
not they, but he, guarantees the veracity of his tale9. So he uses mytheitai in its 
Homeric sense of impressive, authoritative speech. Mythos is the marked term of the 
pair; logos is neutral. The two terms are not simply interchangeable, and careful 
attention is needed to their usage in context. When a term is marked, the marked 
force is often triggered by something in the linguistic context. For instance, storie in 
Italian means ‘stories’; but if I say storie! in a certain tone of voice and with a 
gesture, it means ‘nonsense’. In Hekataios, we are dealing with the opening 
pronouncement of a great work; a very significant context. The word mytheitai, 
without qualification, therefore conveys the necessary nuance (‘this is authoritative 
speech’). Logoi, however, are of themselves simply utterances; the adjectives ‘many’ 
and ‘ridiculous’ indicate what kind of utterance is meant.  
Thus Hekataios is demanding respect from his audience: he is speaking the 
truth. The trouble is, all his rivals made the same claim. They held quite different 
views, and scorned his. The proems of historical, philosophical, and scientific works 
all strike a similar tone, suggesting that I speak the truth, whereas that man lies. It is 
in this context that mythoi acquired their bad name. If mythos is linked to authority as 
it is in the proem of Hekataios’ work, then, when it becomes routine to challenge that 
authority, mythos will be caricatured by rivals as a pretentious or ridiculous claim, 
open to question. This appears to be the meaning in both of Herodotos’ two uses of 
the term, first when referring to (most people agree) Hekataios’ theory of Ocean 
(2.23), then when referring to ‘foolish’ tales the Greeks (presumably again 
Hekataios) tell of Herakles in Egypt (2.45.1). Indeed, Klaus Nickau has attractively 
suggested that in both of these passages, Herodotos is taking direct aim at Hekataios: 
‘the man who spoke about Ocean has put his mythos into the realm of the invisible, 
and cannot be refuted’; ‘this mythos too is foolish’: mythos alludes scornfully to 
Hekataios’ mytheitai10. 
 
8 Fr. 1. References are to Early Greek Mythography I Text and Introduction (Oxford 2000). 
9 See R. Fowler, ‘Early Historiē and Literacy’, in N. Luraghi (ed.), The Historian’s Craft in the Age of 
Herodotus (Oxford 2001) 95-115 at 101-03. 
10 K. Nickau, ‘Mythos und Logos bei Herodot’, in W. Ax (ed.), Memoria rerum veterum. Festschrift für 
Carl Joachim Classen zum 60. Geburtstag (Palingenesia 32, Stuttgart 1990) 83-100. 
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These two passage of Herodotos are suggestive, to say the least. On the other 
hand, these are the only two times that he uses the word mythos. In other passages, 
he discusses what later writers would call ‘myth’ without any embarrassment. In 
truth, Herodotos, and other writers of this period, are a half-way post in the transition 
from ‘authoritative speech’ to ‘imaginative tales’, which did not happen overnight. 
Pindar also associates mythoi with the problematic tales of poets and liars11; but this 
does not prevent him from using mythos of his own poetry, and in other positive 
contexts12. In the fifth century, it is possible for mythos to have both positive and 
negative connotations, even in the same writer: my mythos is true, but your mythos is 
false. Eventually, the balance shifts so that mythoi are presumed to be false unless 
proven otherwise; but, because of the tremendous cultural authority of the traditional 
stories, the possibility that there was some kind of truth about a mythos was never 
quite given up. In the case of the Sophists, ‘truth’, whether of mythos or logos, is of 
doubtful value anyway, at least according to Sokrates; but Protagoras means his 
mythos to convey the same conviction as his logos, only using different means. If we 
may judge from Plato’s dialogue, this mythos/logos distinction was a very important 
weapon in the intellectual arsenal of the Sophists; and as we know from their 
fragments that they made extensive use of traditional stories, it is possible that their 
very public activity started the trend whereby the word mythos, originally a broad 
term, came to mean the legends that we still call the Greek myths.  
Now at the same time as this is happening we can see in Herodotos and others 
that these stories about the remote past were posing problems with respect to 
historical verifiability. Eventually, no later than the late fourth century, the whole 
class of such stories fell under suspicion, and writers could at most appeal to their 
symbolic or moral truth rather than their literal truth. The nature of the gods too was 
being hotly contested in the fifth century BC; Protagoras called into question the 
very possibility of our knowing anything about them. So we have intellectuals 
passionately debating the foundations of knowledge both about the cosmos and 
about human history. Mythoi are in transition: halfway between ‘uncontested, 
authoritative stories’ and ‘stories about which the most one can say is that they have 
symbolic (or moral, or allegorical) truth’; and most of these authoritative stories are 
about the past and/or gods. In the time of Herodotos and his contemporary 
mythographers, therefore, a mythos -why not call it ‘myth’?- is best defined as ‘a 
contestable story about the past and/or about gods’.  
 
11 Ol. 1.28-9, Nem. 7.23, Nem. 8.32-3.  
12 Pyth. 4.298, 9.76. 
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It becomes pertinent then to ask, in exploring the relation of ‘myth’ to 
‘religion’ in these writers, which stories they were prepared to contest, and which 
they thought it best not to challenge. The more sacred a story, the more problematic 
changing it must be. The nature of the debate should reveal something about Greek 
religious feeling. Herodotos is a very rich text from this point of view. Some of his 
procedures will arise from personal predilection and scruple, but that is revealing 
enough, for he will certainly have echoed sentiments shared by at least some of his 
contemporaries. His procedures also relate to his conception of his task as an 
historian, and that too is revealing, as we are dealing with an author’s manoeuvring 
on the panhellenic intellectual scene. 
Particularly in Herodotos’ second book, unsurprisingly in view of his 
fascination with Egyptian religion, we find numerous passages where the issue of 
what can or cannot be said about gods is explicit or implicit. At the very beginning 
of this book (2.3.2), Herodotos tells us that he will avoid relating ‘divine stories’ (ta 
theia tōn apēgēmatōn), except for the gods’ names, and if ‘compelled’ by the 
requirements of his story. The reason given is that ‘every man knows as much as his 
neighbour about them’. This appears to be a kind of tautology, meaning that he will 
not discuss them because they cannot be discussed. Regarding those stories that can 
be discussed openly, Herodotos would surely not think that every man knows as 
much as his neighbour-he would think that he, Herodotos, knows much more than 
his neighbour. His whole business is to publish the results of his inquiry into the 
causes of things, and there are many places where he is emphatic about the errors of 
others. Regarding ‘divine stories’, he is not however even concerned to know 
whether people hold different opinions: each person has his own opinion, and that 
will suffice, for this opinion is not open to contestation, and it may be held without 
challenge, whatever it may be. Therefore there is no point in discussing it. One may 
cite also 9.65.2, where Herodotos ventures an opinion why no Persian dead were 
found in the sanctuary of Demeter at Plataea: he apologises by saying ‘if one must 
have an opinion about divine doings (theia prēgmata)’. He claims no special 
authority for this opinion; you may take it or leave it. Traditionally in Greek 
literature, from Homer onward, individuals may detect the hand of god, but no more 
than that; they cannot with authority name the god in question or even, in many 
situations, be sure that a god has been at work, however much one may suspect it13. 
 
13 See e.g. R. Parker Polytheism and Society at Athens (Oxford 2005) 140; J.D. Mikalson, Herodotus and 
Religion in the Persian Wars (Chapel Hill and London 2003) 131, with further references. 
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As Burkert noted, Herodotos’ discussion of foreign religions is focused almost 
exclusively on ritual-on the externally observable practices14. In this passage of Book 
2, he declares his reluctance to relate the stories about gods connected to these 
rituals. Now as we peruse the list of divine stories that Herodotos does in fact relate 
in Book 2, or declines to relate15, we need to ask, in order to ascertain the nature of 
his scruple, whether he has observed the principle enunciated in 2.3.2, and again at 
2.65.2. Four times he says there is a ‘sacred story’ (hiros logos) about something, 
which he does not then relate (2.48.3, 2.51.4, 2.62.2, 2.81.2). At 2.51.4 the logos 
comes from one of the Greek mystery cults, which were secret; divulging the story 
would be sacrilegious. Dionysos and Demeter were the main gods of Greek mystery 
religions; it is perhaps that which prevents Herodotos from mentioning even the 
name of Osiris, the Egyptian Dionysos, at 2.61.1, 2.86.2, 2.132.2, and 2.170-1. The 
silence about Orphics at 2.123.3 could be related, as Dionysos was central to Orphic 
doctrine. At 2.48.3 he does not relate the hiros logos about the phallic images of 
Dionysos. At 2.46.2, however, he says only that it would be ‘unpleasant’ to relate a 
story about Pan, and at 2.47.2 he says a certain tale would be ‘unseemly’ to tell. 
Here, Dionysos is in question, so perhaps we have another mystery cult, and the tale 
is therefore hiros; but the language here and in 2.46.2 suggests rather that Herodotos 
merely finds the stories distasteful (at 2.47.2 the context is Egyptian beliefs about 
pigs, which were disgusting in their view; swineherds were a class of untouchables). 
These two stories look to be suppressed for personal, not religious reasons. We need 
not perhaps require him to mention repellent things; and notice his propriety also at 
2.132.2, where a story about incest revolts him16.  
So far, then, we may say that, with the reasonable exception of these morally 
distasteful stories, the principle of 2.3.2 has been carried out consistently with respect 
to cults that were certainly or possibly mysteries. But at 2.65.2, where he reiterates 
his principle, he has just finished telling a story about Ares, which it is hard to see 
was necessary: he could have declined to tell it as he did others, and no harm would 
have been done. We know nothing of this cult, but one suspects (from the fact that 
Herodotos does talk about it) that it was not a mystery cult; but his principle as twice 
 
14 W. Burkert, ‘Herodot als Historiker fremder Religionen’, in Hérodote et les peuples non grecs: 
Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique XXXV (Vandoeuvres/Geneva 1990) 1-32 = Kleine Schriften VII: 
Tragica et Historica, ed. W. Rösler (Göttingen 2007) 140-60. 
15 See the Appendix. 
16 We should take Herodotos at his word, and not understand his appeal to taste as a cover for religious 
scruple; that elsewhere his sense of impropriety seems inactive is neither here nor there, given the 
arbitrary nature of such things. Cf. T. Harrison, Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus (Oxford 
2000) 186 n. 12.  
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enunciated does not obviously distinguish between mystery cults and others. All 
‘divine stories’ should be excluded. Furthermore, at 2.42 he feels free to tell a story 
about Zeus and Herakles which explains a goat sacrifice, and other mythical material 
appears at 2.156 (the story of Leto and Apollo)17.  
There appears to be no plausible way to save Herodotos’ consistency, unless 
we accept that when he declines to discuss ta theia tōn apēgēmatōn, he means not 
stories in which gods figure as characters, but stories in which the gods have a direct 
interest, such that one might offend them if one is not careful. On this view, theion is 
more or less equivalent to hiron, sacred. To tread on the holy ground, the abaton, is 
impious, ouk hosion; so one avoids these topics. For some inscrutable reason 
Herodotos does not feel that he risks causing offence at 2.42, 2.65 and 2.156. But 
this would be a strange programmatic announcement, given that no one would 
expect him to reveal the details of mystery religions in any case. A simpler 
explanation would allow him these few lapses, and relate his procedure to ‘the 
requirements of the story’, that is, his conception of his task. As always in Herodotos 
we should assume some target, and the obvious one here is Hekataios. Herodotos 
delivers his pronouncement at the same time as he tells us he has been to Thebes and 
Heliopolis, where he consulted the learned priests. Hekataios’ misadventure at 
Thebes is the subject of the famous anecdote at 2.143. Egyptian religion is one of 
country’s marvels and will naturally form a prominent part of his historiē. Herodotos 
here is warning his audience what not to expect; so one infers that their expectations 
were conditioned by what they had heard elsewhere, i.e. from Hekataios. Hekataios, 
then, must have told some of these divine stories that Herodotos omits, even though 
the supposition is not borne out by the miserable remaining fragments18. More 
generally, one is tempted to see here a broader reference to all those who related 
divine stories, pointlessly peddling that about which all opinions are equally valid; 
that is, Herodotos is advising his audience ‘expect no mythography from me’. If that 
is a legitimate reading, it implies a sense of generic definitions and boundaries, and 
acknowledges the existence of an obvious comparitor from which Herodotos would 
distance himself, and competitor whom he would claim to have left far behind.  
 
17 At 2.91 the epiphany of Perseus, like all other epiphanies in the Histories, is reported in indirect 
speech; I take this as indicative of skepticism: see ‘Gods in Early Greek Historiography’, forthcoming in 
J.N. Bremmer and A. Erskine, edd., The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations 
(Edinburgh 2009). For discussion of the problems raised by Herodotus’ reticence in Book 2, see Harrison 
(above, n. 16) ch. 7; Mikalson (above, n. 13) 144, with references to earlier treatments. 
18 For possible references to divine myth in the Periodos see the Appendix; for divine and heroic myth 
see the list on p. 146 of EGM I.  
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Herodotos’ feelings in these matters were clearly strong, and may be related to 
other aspects of the Histories. His views of religion and of history are part of the 
same project19. In his proem, he rehearses different accounts of the origin of hostility 
between Greeks and Persians, placed in what we would call the mythical period; 
these stories Herodotos dismisses as unknowable (1.5.3). That famous declaration is 
of course highly significant for Herodotos’ historiographical outlook, but for present 
purposes note that the dismissed stories are rationalised versions of the traditional 
tales. Herodotos has written the gods completely out of them. This is in keeping with 
his skepticism throughout the Histories, in many passages (including 2.123.1 in the 
Appendix), about face-to-face interaction of gods and humans; he is, on the other 
hand, very clear that the gods direct the general course of human history from afar, 
punishing transgressions and engineering the up-and-down cycle of history. Thus in 
the Helen story (2.118-20) he has no room for the Judgement of Paris, but concludes 
with an emphatic statement (2.120.5) that the gods arranged events in such a way 
that wrongdoing was seen to be punished.  
In another well-known passage (3.122.2) he distinguishes the ‘so-called’ 
human generation and that of people like Minos20. On which side of the line do 
the heroes fall? Herodotos had doubts about this, as well he might given the 
nature of heroes in Greek cult. Minos is son of Zeus (though not named as such in 
3.122.2), so only one generation from the gods (and a sort of god in the 
Underworld after his death); but elsewhere in the Histories Herodotos speaks of 
him as if historical (1.171-3, 7.169-71). Stories about Herakles are told in book 2 
and again in book 4; but in book 2 Herodotos thinks it prudent to ask forgiveness 
in case he has caused offence (2.45.3). Given this ambivalence, one can 
understand how he might adopt tactics to ensure that a tale was clearly on the 
right side of the line, and so a legitimate subject of discussion. The rationalising 
of the proem and the humanising of the Helen story are examples of this revision 
prior to open discussion. In 2.132, the story of Mykerinos’ daughter, Herodotos 
reveals that there are competing stories about this girl: that alone suggests he did 
not consider the story hiros, therefore open for debate, and it is interesting that he 
has adopted a version that is decent, realistic and rationalised. Another and 
perhaps the most convincing example of this tendency is his consistency in not 
 
19 See ‘Gods in Early Greek Historiography’ (above, n. 17). 
20 Nickau (above, n. 10) 96 well notes that this phrase presumes a certain amount of discussion on the 
topic, on which Herodotos is here adopting a non-committal stance. 
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naming the divine parents of human heroes; of ten examples in the Histories, he slips 
only once, calling Perseus ‘son of Zeus and Danae’ at 7.61.321.  
 We have already noted how in epic Louden’s definition of myth requires one 
to stretch a point if heroes are to be part of it; one must stress their divine side. We 
have noted that for Herodotos, stories about gods not only create difficulties of 
verification, but present religious risks. But we have defined mythos as a contestable 
story. It seems to follow that stories one feels should not, or cannot, be disputed are 
not myths; in other words, that Herodotos’ stories about the gods, though fitting 
Louden’s definition perfectly, are not myths, whereas others which involve heroes, 
even though the divine element has been downplayed or removed, are myths 
because they can be contested. We appear to have a contradiction. 
 The way out of this dilemma is to realise that Louden’s definition is etic, not 
emic; it is that of an outsider. We would say that the divine stories relating to cults 
were myths, but that is because we no longer feel the religious sanctions attached to 
them, and we do not seriously consider that they might be true. The same dynamic 
exists today: believers in the great religions are apt to take offence if you call their 
sacred stories ‘myths’, since it implies the possibility of dispute. Even if one assigns 
symbolic rather than literal truth to the stories, believers will be unhappy. One has to 
be an outsider to recognise a society’s myths; by definition one cannot recognise 
one’s own myths. Herodotos shows himself aware of the problems inherent in some 
of these stories, and foregrounds the difficulty of knowing the truth about them. 
Some he rejects as false, others he modifies so that they can be verified or falsified, 
and about others he remains agnostic or silent. Veyne’s question, did the Greeks 
believe in their myths?22, is answered in the negative as soon as the concept of 
‘myth’ is thought of. In fact, no one believes in their myths (or, put another way, 
belief can only exist where doubt is possible).  
 The status of heroes is comprehensible in this light. Excessive dispute about 
them would be unseemly if they were simply gods. Stories must first be desanctified 
if they are to be contested. By this process they become mythoi in the Greek sense, 
but one aims to find the true logos about them, defeating other, contesting 
interpretations. In truth the part-human, part-divine status of heroes always made it 
easy to offer competing stories about them, whereas gods are different. One can 
observe a similar dynamic in the mythographers, to whom we now turn. Of the 29 
authors in the corpus of Early Greek Mythography, only two included theogonies in 
 
21 Harrison, Divinity and History (above, n. 16) 89. 
22 P. Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? An Essay on the Consitutive Imagination, tr. P. 
Wissing (Chicago 1988; French original 1983). 
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their works: Akousilaos and Epimenides -or rather, pseudo-Epimenides. This latter 
prose mythographical work is a reworking of a poetic theogony, attributed to the 
Cretan wonderworker. Akousilaos, for his part, was posing as a seer and prophet; his 
stance earned him a place on some people’s list of the Seven Wise Men (test. 11) In 
other words, both these works claimed the stamp of divine authority, like Hesiod at 
the opening of his Theogony. Ordinary mythographers claimed no such status, and 
confined themselves to heroic mythology. This was true already before the great 
methodological debates of the mid-fifth century, i.e. in Hekataios and Pherekydes, 
which implies (unsurprisingly) that there were pre-existing cultural norms that 
affected the course of those debates-viz., that heroes weren’t quite gods, and so 
elicited different responses23. 
 In another way too the mythographers are like Herodotos. They are interested 
in religion, and report its outward manifestations. If they are local historians or, in 
the case of Hekataios, the author of a Periodos, their information, like Herodotos’, 
often comes from first-hand familiarity. In the Appendix there are examples of 
references to local cults and religious phenomena, including at Samothrace which 
was the home of a mystery cult; this figures in no fewer than four authors. 
Unfortunately we do not have any actual quotations to see whether they were 
reticent like Herodotos. One can see in two cases (Akous. 20 and Pher. 48) their 
interest in those odd creatures, the Kabeiroi and the Korybantes, who were at home 
in several locations-what was said of them at Samothrace was perhaps part of the 
public mythology surrounding the mystery cult (like the story in the Homeric Hymn 
to Demeter at Eleusis).  
 These references to gods, cults, shrines or sacred landmarks read superficially 
like those in Herodotos. In a fundamental way, however, the mythographers differ 
from him. They are interested in the stories, of which they tell hundreds, whereas he 
is interested in the cults, and hardly ever tells the related stories. Where we have 
verbatim quotations, we can gain some idea of the mythographers’ procedure with 
respect to cult: they tell a story and draw the link with cult en passant, or at the end 
(rather in the manner of a Euripidean tragedy). Contrast Herodotos’ procedure at 
2.63 and 7.197, the stories of Egyptian Ares and Athamas: he proceeds the other 
way, from event or cult to myth. Of course, this is his genre: recent history, not 
archaiologia; ethnography, not mythography. Hekataios too, in his Periodos, would 
have first noticed a landmark, and then told us a myth connected with it. But surely 
 
23 Similarly tragedy concentrates overwhelmingly on heroic, not divine myth: R. Parker, Polytheism 
(above, n. 13) 137 citing B. Knox, Word and Action: Essays on the Ancient Theater (Baltimore 1979) 
8-9.  
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in Herodotos’ long work he could have told many divine myths about the hundreds 
of localities he mentions (like Hekataios, in fact). This looks like deliberate 
omission. Outside Book 2 and its land full of strange gods, there is hardly a single 
divine myth. 
 The mythographers tell the stories, and occasionally draw an explicit link with 
a contemporary practices. Of course, many of the myths could have been connected 
with cult (and sometimes we know that they were: I have given a few examples in 
the Appendix), and the first pages of any local history explained the origin of 
landmarks and sites that were very familiar to the local audience. In this way-and 
through genealogies, which gave the ancestry of still living individuals-they 
explained the sacred foundation of the contemporary world order. One can say that 
Herodotos was demythologising history, whereas the mythographers were 
attempting to historicise mythology. Even while disputing each others’ versions of 
tales, the mythographers had no doubt that one of these versions (theirs) had to be 
true. In that sense they are not dealing with myth at all. They did not call themselves 
mythographers24 and would have regarded themselves as historians, if they could 
know the term. Herodotos, by contrast, displays doubts about the whole category; or 
at least he is much more aware of the problematic epistemology, and so he famously 
concentrates on what he can know. With that move, the big bang has occurred; 
mythology is born. Eden is left behind. It remained only to work out which stories 
were the myths. 
 The mythographers are less reticent than Herodotos about divine affairs, and 
his scruples account for some of the difference between them. His emerging sense of 
history as opposed to myth increases the gap greatly. The mythographers do not 
write the gods out of the heroic stories; the gods propagate the heroic clans, assist 
their favourites on their quests, and directly manipulate human affairs, with no more 
hint of doubt than in Homer. But both the mythographers and Herodotos are all fully 
involved in the process of contestation, and this points to a remarkable fact about 
Greek myths and their relation to Greek religion, which is the sheer amount that is 
contestable. With the exception of the secret myths of mystery cults and theogony 
(and even here prophets and poets could meddle), stories could be freely exchanged, 
and modified without offending the deity. Local stories were detached from their 
context and spread abroad, sometimes losing all trace of an original connection with 
cult. This intricate web of free-floating stories from all over the Greek world became 
the common mythological heritage, the pseudo-historical foundation of contem-
 
24 The term first appears in the fourth century: R. L. Fowler “P. Oxy. 4458: Posidorios”, ZPE 132 (2000) 
133-42. 
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porary life, and the cultural capital of all educated people. It is a process that long 
predates our surviving texts, even Homer. In the passages in the Appendix one can 
see this at work: though I have distinguished between ‘panhellenic mythography’ 
and ‘local history’, in fact the line is blurred-panhellenic mythographers are happy to 
work local stories into their web; local historians show an interest in other localities 
than their own, and link their stories to the common heritage.  
 Myths constitute a parallel discourse to that of ritual, operating according to 
its own rules; it touches on ritual often, but leaves its essence unaffected. One is 
almost tempted to argue, in this perspective, that Greek myth had nothing to do with 
Greek religion! In a different sense, it had everything to do with Greek religion: it is 
through Greek mythology that the great poets elaborated a powerful and distinctive 
world-view, with the gods and heroes at the centre. This is the realm of values and 
beliefs. With respect to ritual, however, except in the mysteries where the myths link 
directly to the actions and their deadly serious meaning, the myths are detachable, 
and can live a life on their own, while the ritual goes on for reasons that have little or 
nothing to do with the myth. One has the impression that they would work just as 
well whatever story one chose to tell of them25. Of course, it is important to 
acknowledge that links were routinely drawn -the precise myth might not make 
much difference, but one needed a myth- and one might fruitfully study the patterns 
and contexts of known connections between myths and rituals, to see if general 
conclusions could be drawn about the interplay of the two discourses; such a study, 
well beyond the scope of these brief reflections, might in its turn shed much light on 
Greek religious feeling. But on the level of specific rituals the adventitious nature of 
the myths is clear, and this lack of organic union is the reason why attempts to find 
connections between myths and rituals not known from independent evidence to be 
connected are so often unpersuasive.  
 Paradoxically, then, the heroic stories that are the glory of Greek myth are 
pertinent to Greek religion mainly in a special, if powerful, sense; but equally 
paradoxically, because of their peculiar nature, they gave rise to the notion opposite 
of myth, that is history. Like much else in human history, cultural contingencies 
played their role; in the case of Greece, if one asks what it was about their religion 
that allowed such a large body of tales with clearly religious aspects (involvement of 
gods in various ways) to become sufficiently desacralised that religious scruple no 
longer acted as a constraint on their content or use, one might appeal to various 
factors. The strongly anthropomorphic character of Greek religion broke down 
certain boundaries between sacred and profane; gods being familiar in a thousand 
 
25 Cf. Parker, Polytheism (above, n. 13) 374 ff. on the aetiology of festivals, and Graf (above, n. 4) 52.  
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everyday contexts meant that they acted as less of a constraint in other ways too 
when compared with some other religious traditions. Another thought might be that 
the process actually works in the opposite direction: we should not think of the 
heroes as gods needing desacralisation, but as having acquired a touch of divine aura 
during the development of poetic traditions, and through the rise of the hero cults; 
since the substrate was a proto-historical notion of ancestors, reversing the process of 
sacralisation was easier, given the right conditions and a spirit of critical inquiry, 
than would be the case if they were simply minor divinities. Then again one would 
not fail to think of the great panhellenic festivals and the splendid bards who 
performed at them; such occasions were in honour of gods to be sure, as all public 
occasions were, but the stories they told each other had no ritual imperative with 
respect to content, and audiences hungered to hear the wise poets relate and 
embellish the tales from every corner of the Greek world, themselves detached from 
original contexts and necessarily made over to fit the new one; and made new once, 
they could be made new a hundred times, by each successive storyteller. By such 
means the Greek heroic myths flourished and multiplied, to become the unique 
heritage that they were, continuing throughout antiquity to work as a necessary 
complement to Greek religion, but also, as I have sought to describe, capable of 
living a quite different existence26. 
 
26 I am grateful to audiences at Valladolid and the Graduate Centre of the City University of New York 
for their helpful comments on the oral version of this paper, and to my respective hosts in those cities, 
Emilio Suárez de la Torre and Jacob Stern, for their invitations and hospitality; and to Jan Bremmer and 
Robert Parker for astute comments on the draft. 
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APPENDIX 
 
CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED STORIES ABOUT GODS IN 
HERODOTOS 
 
1.182.1 Chaldaeans claim that the god comes in person to sleep in the temple: 
H. does not believe it 
2.3.2 H. not eager to relate ta theia tōn apēgēmatōn (‘divine stories’=myths?) 
apart from the names of the gods themselves, since ‘each man knows as 
much as his neighbour about them. I shall mention only what is 
required by my story’. 
2.42 H. relates the reason for a sacrifical custom at Egyptian Thebes (story of 
Herakles and Zeus) 
2.45 Greeks tell a foolish mythos about how the Egyptians tried to sacrifice 
Herakles, but he dispatched his would-be sacrificers in their thousands. 
(Is Herakles a god or a man? H. seems to know it’s debatable: he argues 
that if Herakles was a mere man, ‘as people say’, he could not have 
killed all those people single-handedly. He then promptly asks 
forgiveness of all the ‘gods and heroes’ for what he has said.) 
2.46.2 H. declines to say, as being ‘unpleasant’ (ouk hēdion), why the 
Egyptians depict Pan as a goat, though they do not believe he looks like 
one. The context is the reason why some Egyptians do not sacrifice 
goats.  
2.47.2 H. declines to relate, as ‘unseemly’ (ouk euprepesteros),  the story 
(logos) which explains why the Egyptians do not sacrifice pigs except 
at this one festival 
2.48.3 H. notes (but does not relate) a logos hiros about phallic images of 
Dionysos used in a procession 
2.51.4 Anyone who is an initiate of the rites of the Kabeiroi on Samothrace 
will vouch for H.’s view that the Greeks adopted the practice of making 
ithyphallic herms from the Pelasgians. There is a sacred tale (hiros 
logos) about this told to the initiates. 
2.57 H. rationalises the foundation legend of the oracle of Dodona (doves 
could not possibly speak like humans; it was the speech of the foreign 
women in the story, which sounded like the twittering of birds) 
2.61.1 H. declines to say, as impious (ouk hosion), in whose honour the people 
beat their breasts after the sacrifice at this festival (it is in fact 
Osiris=Dionysos) (reticent again at 2.132) 
2.62.2 At Sais, the rite involves lamps at night; why they do so is explained by 
a sacred story (hiros logos).  
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2.63 H. relates a local story about how Ares tried to force his way into his 
mother’s temple: this explains the ritual combat which takes place at the 
festival in Papremis. Here he feels no qualms about relating the myth; 
but has he suppressed the original motif that Ares sought sexual 
intercourse with his mother. (Is this tale then not hiros, and therefore 
open to discussion and contestation?) 
2.65.1-2 The Egyptians hold all animals to be sacred (hira). ‘To explain why, I 
should need to enter into discussion of divine matters (ta theia 
prēgmata), which I particularly seek to avoid doing; whatever I have 
said by way of illustration has been a matter of mere necessity.’  
2.81.2 Orphics and Bacchics are not permitted to be buried in woollen 
garments. There is a hiros logos about this. 
2.86.2 H. declines to mention the deity in whose image the most expensive 
form of model mummy is made (it is Osiris again) 
2.112-20 H.’s discussion of Helen. But is this ‘myth’? Gods do not figure until 
the very end when he says that the Greeks refused to believe that Helen 
was not in Troy because the gods wished to show that wickedness will 
be punished. 
2.122-3 The reason for a certain festival is that the Pharaoh Rhampsinitos 
descended to Hades and played dice with Demeter. ‘Let him who finds 
these Egyptian tales credible believe them; for my part my intention 
throughout this book is simply to record what I have heard.’ 
2.123.3 H. declines to mention the names of authors who have adopted the 
Egyptian doctrine of the immortality of the soul (they are Pythagoreans 
and Orphics) 
2.132.2 H. contests a second (NB: more than one in circulation, which indicates 
contestation of itself) story about the statues at the tomb of Mykerinos’ 
daughter. The story he rejects involves incest. 
2.156 Aetiology of the floating island of Chemmis (story of Leto and Apollo) 
2.170-1 H. will not mention, as impious (ouk hosion), the name of the god in 
whose honours the rites at Sais are performed (it is Osiris=Dionysos 
again). He knows all about the rites but will remain quiet (eustoma). 
Similarly about the Thesmophoria, except what it is permissible (hosie) 
to mention: the rites were brought to Greece by the daughters of Danaos 
who taught it to the Pelasgians; after the Dorian invasion it was 
forgotten, except in Arcadia where the people were not evicted.  
7.189 Story of Boreas and Oreithyia, and his assistance at Cape Sepias (leads 
to institution of cult in Athens) (The story is conveyed in indirect 
speech, and H. reserves judgement about Boreas’ causing the storm) 
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7.191 Magi sacrifice to Thetis at Cape Sepias because this is where she was 
carried off; storm abates (H. offers alternative natural explanation)  
 
Aetiological stories set in the legendary period: 2.91, festival in honour of 
Perseus at Chemmis, and his frequent epiphanies there (H. is always skeptical about 
these); 4.32-5, variants about the Hyperboreans and the rites at Delos; 7.197, story of 
Athamas, related to the cult of Laphystian Zeus. The latter (related in indirect 
speech) is required to explain why Xerxes avoided the sanctuary; the first two are 
accompanied by various indications of doubt. Aetiological stories / references to cult 
set in historical period: 1.167 of a festival at Agylla (arising from impious murder in 
6th c.); 3.48 Samian festival (connected with dispute with Corinthians in time of 
Periander); 3.79 festival Magophonia in Persia commemorating the death of the 
Magi conspirators (accession of Dareios, 522 BC); 6.105 cult of Pan instituted at 
Athens after Pheidippides met him (490 BC). Among mythographers: Charon 7, cult 
of Lampsake at Lampsakos; Hekataios 138, virgin sacrifice to Lemnian goddess 
(inhabited by barbarians; Lemnos also in Hellanikos fr. 71); 324A Egyptian god 
Aphthos 
 
REFERENCES TO CULT IN EARLY MYTHOGRAPHY 
(Excluded are stories which we might suspect to be aetiological from other evidence 
or on general grounds-some possibilities are listed ad finem below; foundation 
legends, which usually involve a god mating with a local nymph-many examples of 
these in the fragments of local history; simple eponyms, such as the fountain of 
Ismene at Thebes in Pherekydes 95; and genealogies traced back to a god, which is 
not exactly cult anyway, but does claim a living relationship with a god.) 
 
A) PANHELLENIC MYTHOGRAPHY  
Akousilaos 20 and Pherekydes 48: Kabeiroi, Korybantes: the rites on Samothrace 
explicitly mentioned. (Hellanikos 23 also conveys information about 
Samothrace, though with no mention of cult) 
Deilochos: title of work On Samothrace turned up in palimpsest; nothing known of 
contents 
Hekataios 305: shrine of Leto in Boutoi (Egypt)  
Hellanikos 6 (from the Deukalioneia): Deukalion founds altar of 12 gods; 109 (from 
Phoronis?): Telamon founds altar of Herakles Alexikakos at Troy  
Herodoros 34: Herakles establishes altars at Olympia; 48 information about Apollo 
of the Dawn 
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Pherekydes 43: information about Aigaios Poseidon; 47 Dactyls; 48 Kabeiroi; 84 
shrine of Alkmene at Thebes; 149 cult titles Oulios/e Apollo and Artemis; 175 
(dub.) cult titles Zeus Hikesios and Alastoros 
B) LOCAL HISTORY 
(Note these local historians sometimes give information about other people’s 
localities.) 
Agias and Derkyllos (Argive) 4 local wells at Argos supply water for young women 
in various rites; 8, aition for a cult of the Graces on Paros (reason why no 
auloi are used); 8A, aition for dog sacrifice at Argos 
Aristophanes (Boeotian) 2 information about cult of Homoloios Zeus; 9 information 
about Argynnis Aphrodite; 9A aition for the Lysioi Teletai of Dionysos 
Armenidas (Theban) 1 = Hek. 2 information about Itonis Athena (Thessalian cult; 
Iton mentioned by Hek. also at fr. 168); 6 information about the Seven Pyres 
in Thebes 
Charon (Lampsakene) 5 Aphrodite called Kybebe by Phrygians and Lydians 
Hellanikos (Lesbian) 125 (from Atthis): story of Xanthos and Melanthos presented 
as aition for the Apatouria; 163 (from Atthis): information about shrine of 
Kolainis Artemis; 165 (from Atthis): Theseus founds Isthmian Games 
Kreophylos (Ephesian) 1 aetiological myth for founding of various local shrines and 
temples;  3 his version of the story of the children of Medeia (connected with 
cult of Akraia Hera in Corinth) (Medeia at Corinth also in Hell. 133) 
Menekrates (Xanthian) 2 Leto, Artemis and Apollo, and the foundation of local 
shrines and cults 
Metrodoros (Chian) 3 information about Smyrnaean cult - details of sacrifice to 
Boubrostis 
Xenomedes (Kean): 2 cult title Athena Tauropolos (perhaps corrupt for Taurobolos) 
Probably connected with cult, but link not explicitly drawn in surviving 
fragment: Akousilaos 23 Kaineus; 28 Proitides; Charon 2 Alkmene’s cup at 
Sparta; Hekataios 15 unique story of Oineus and grapevines, probably from 
local source; 72 name of Zankle in Sicily from the sickle that castrated Kronos 
(perhaps a cult object); Herodoros 31 site in Herakleia where Kerberos was 
brought up from Hades; Pherekydes 34 Kephalos and Prokris at Thorikos; 47 
= Hellanikos 89 information about Idaean Dactyls; 49 Thriai; 64 legend of 
Neoptolemos at Delphi, and burial of the dagger beneath the threshold of the 
temple; 98 Phrixos (cf. Hdt. 7.197 above); 137 children of Helios and Rhode 
on Rhodes (local information vouched for); 140 Anios and the Oinotropoi on 
Delos; 167 Amazon invasion of Attica; Xenomedes 1 much information about 
first inhabitants, foundation of cities on Keos; story of Demonax probably 
aetiological. 
 
